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DAIMLERCHRYSLER V. CUNO - PLAINTIFFS LACK
STANDING TO CHALLENGE STATE FRANCHISE TAX
CREDIT IN FEDERAL COURT, ACCORDING TO
THE SUPREME COURT
SUE ANN MOTA*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The judicial power shall extend to all Cases . . [and] Controver-
sies."1 "The Congress shall have the Power ... to regulate Commerce
•.. among the several States."2
In May 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno3 unanimously held that plaintiffs did not establish the requisite
standing to challenge Ohio's franchise tax credit in the federal courts.
The plaintiffs included taxpaying and displaced residents of Toledo,
Ohio, as well as residents of Michigan.4 The Court vacated in part and
remanded the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,5
which held that Ohio's investment tax credits violated the Commerce
Clause.6 This case is very important in its holding on the standing
issue, but the important issue of state incentives to obtain and keep
business in the state remains.
This article will examine the issue of standing in federal court by
taxpayers challenging governmental action. The article will then ad-
dress the DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno7 case and will conclude with
thoughts on changing or challenging these state tax incentives to
companies.
* Sue Ann Mota, Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling State University, J.D., University of
Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State University.
1. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2286
(2006).
4. Id.
5. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004).
6. Id. at 746.
7. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
1
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II. TAXPAYER STANDING TO CHALLENGE STATE TAX CREDIT IN
FEDERAL COURT
The issue of taxpayer standing to bring suit in federal court is an
important preliminary issue before the merits of any such case are
reached. This section will chronologically, briefly, and more exhaus-
tively examine selected Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue as
background to the 2006 unanimous decision by the Court in Daimler-
Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno.8
The Supreme Court in 1923, in Frothingham v. Mellon,9 held that a
suit by a federal taxpayer to enjoin the enforcement of the Congres-
sionally enacted Maternity Act,10 which offered financial aid to states
to supplement their own efforts to reduce maternal and infant mortal-
ity and to protect the health of mothers and infants, had to be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction." The taxpayer had neither an "interest
in the subject-matter" nor any "injury' inflicted or threatened," which
enabled her to sue. 2 Thus, the suit was dismissed without considering
the merits of the constitutional question.' 3
The U.S. Supreme Court in 1952, in Doremus v. Board of Education
of the Borough of Hawthorne, held similarly, in a case where a parent
and a taxpayer challenged a state statute.14 A student and parents
challenged a New Jersey statute 5 requiring the reading of five verses
of the Old Testament at the start of each day in the public schools
under the First Amendment. 6 The New Jersey Supreme Court held
in a declaratory judgment that the act did not violate the Constitu-
tion.17 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court granted the mo-
tion to dismiss the appeal' 8 because the Court's jurisdiction is limited
to "Cases [or] Controversies."19 Citing Massachusetts v. Mellon,2" the
8. Id.
9. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
10. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 161-163 (2006) (repealed 1927).
11. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 480. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts also sued Mellon,
the Secretary of the Treasury, along with the Chief of the Children's Bureau of the Department
of Labor, the Surgeon General, and the U.S. Commissioner of Education. The last three defend-
ants made up the Board of Maternity and Infant Hygiene under the Maternity Act.
12. Id.
13. Id. The Court held that the suit brought by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
against Mellon also failed to present a controversy, either on the states behalf or as a representa-
tive of its citizens. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
14. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
15. N.J. Rev. Stat., 1937, 18:14-77, cited in Doremus, 342 U.S. at 430.
16. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 430.
17. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 75 A.2d 880, 881-82 (N.J. 1950).
18. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433.
19. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
20. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
2006]
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Court stated that what was held about a federal statute is equally true
when a state act is challenged. 1
In 1968, in Flast v. Cohen,22 the Court carved out an exception to
the bar to taxpayer suits of Frothingham v. Mellon.23 Flast and other
taxpayers filed suit in federal district court challenging the expendi-
ture of federal funds under the federal Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation Act of 1965.24 The taxpayers alleged that the expenditure
violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.2 1 While the three-judge district court held that the
plaintiffs' status as federal taxpayers did not give them standing to
26 2sue, on direct appeal to the Supreme Court,27 the Court held that
the plaintiffs did have standing to sue as the Establishment Clause
specifically limits the taxing and spending power conferred by Article
I, Clause 8.28 The Court left the issue of other specific limitations to
future cases.2 9
The Court in 1975, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization,3" held that plaintiffs, organizations composed of indigent
people, as well as indigent people individually, lacked standing to
challenge a revenue ruling3' that allowed favorable tax-exempt status
to nonprofit hospitals that offered only emergency room services to
indigents,32 thus "encouraging" hospitals to deny further services to
21. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433. The student's case is moot, since she graduated. The parents
who are taxpayers did not show the necessary direct and particular financial interest necessary to
bring the case. Three dissenters would have moved to the merits, and would have denied a case
only to enjoin a federal law. Justice Douglas stated, "It is odd indeed to hold there is no case or
controversy within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution." Id. at 436 (Douglas J.,
dissenting).
22. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), rev'd by Flast v. Gardner, 271 Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
23. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
24. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85, (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 241(a), 821 (1962) (repealed 1978)).
25. Id.
26. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968).
27. 28 U.S.C. §1253 (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to
the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying after notice and hearing an interlocutory
or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress
to be heard and determined by district court of three judges."), cited in Flast, 392 U.S. at 88.
28. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06. The Court expressed no view on the merits of the case.
29. Id. at 105.
30. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1975). The district court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 327
(D.D.C. 1973). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed on the merits. Si-
mon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
31. The issuance of Revenue Ruling 69-545 led to the filing of the suit. Simon, 426 U.S. at
32. The Internal Revenue Code gives advantageous tax treatment to corporations organized and
operated for charitable purposes. 26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
32. Simon, 426 U.S. at 28.
3
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indigents.33 Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, stated that he
could not imagine a case, outside the First Amendment, where a per-
son whose tax liability was not affected could have standing to litigate
the federal tax liability of someone else.34
In a First Amendment Establishment Clause challenge, the Court in
1982, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State,35 held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue as taxpayers because the challenged act fell under Congress's
power under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution and not the
Taxing and Spending Clause.36 The plaintiffs, Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, challenged the transfer of surplus
property, a seventy-seven acre parcel of land that had been part of a
former military hospital to Valley Forge Christian College.37 The
transfer occurred pursuant to the Federal Property and Administra-
tive Services Act,38 which allowed the transfer of surplus property to
private or public entities.39  Citing Frothingham,4 ° Doremus,41 and
Flast,42 the Court stated that the test for taxpayer standing was not
fulfilled because the transfer was not a Congressional action but
rather an agency decision to dispose of surplus property, and the
transfer was not an exercise of authority under the Taxing and Spend-
ing Clause.43
In 1984, the Court held that parents of black public school children
in a nationwide class action alleging that the Internal Revenue Service
had not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to deny tax-ex-
empt status to racially discriminatory private schools lacked standing
to bring the suit in Allen v. Wright.' The plaintiffs alleged two inju-
ries. First, they claimed they were harmed because the government
granted financial aid to racially segregated private educational institu-
33. Id at 33.
34. Id. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
36. Id. at 465.
37. The college was a nonprofit educational institution operated by the Assemblies of God.
Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 468.
38. 40 U.S.C. § 484 (1976 & Supp. III) (current version at 40 U.S.C.S. §550 (2006)), cited in
Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 466.
39. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 466-67.
40. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
41. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
42. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
43. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 477-80.
44. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739-40 (1984). The dissent believed that the plaintiffs did
have standing as they alleged an injury in fact which was traceable to the conduct they claimed
was unlawful and the separation of powers principle does not create a jurisdictional obstacle to
the consideration on the merits. Id. at 783 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
2006]
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tions.45 Second, they alleged this governmental action impaired their
ability to desegregate public schools.46 Because Article III limits the
federal courts to adjudication "cases and controversies, '4 7 the Court
held that the alleged injury was not "judicially cognizable."48
In Bowen v. Kendrick in 1988, 49 the Court held that the Adolescent
Family Life Act ° did not violate the Establishment Clause on the
Act's face, but the case was remanded on the constitutionality of the
Act's validity as applied.51 In Kendick, the Court found it undisputed
that a group of federal taxpayers had standing to challenge the Act on
its face, as the Act is a program of disbursement of funds for services
and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and
pregnancy, and this disbursement is pursuant to Congress's taxing and
spending powers.52 Thus, there is a sufficient nexus between the tax-
payer's standing as a taxpayer and Congress's exercise of the taxing
and spending power, on the Establishment Clause challenge.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,53 in 1992, the Court held that en-
vironmental organizations lacked the requisite standing to challenge a
regulation interpreting the Endangered Species Act.54 The only issue
reached by the Court was whether the wildlife conservation group and
other environmental groups had standing in their action seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the regulation was in error and an injunction
requiring the promulgation for a new regulation.55 The party invoking
federal jurisdiction must establish standing including the following
three elements: the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact of a
legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized, as
well as actual and imminent; there must be a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of and not the result of
some independent action of a third party; and it must be likely that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.56 The Court held
45. Id. at 752.
46. Id. at 752-53. The parents did not allege that their children had been discriminatorily
excluded from the private schools. Id. at 746.
47. Id. at 750, (citing U.S. CONsT. art 3).
48. Id. at 755.
49. Bowens v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
50. 42 U.S.C. §3002 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), cited in Bowens, 487 U.S. at 593.
51. Bowens, 487 U.S. at 589.
52. Bowens, 487 U.S. at 619-20. The Court did not consider the standing of other plaintiffs,
members of the clergy and the American Jewish Congress. Id. at 620 n.15. The standing of the
taxpayer appealers to challenge the Act as applied was disputed; the Court remanded the case to
determine the merits of this issue. Id. at 621.
53. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
54. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (2006) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2) (2006)). The regulation
limits the applicability of the statute to actions only involving the U.S. or on the high seas.
55. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558.
56. Id. at 560-61.
5
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that there was no standing because there was no showing of injury-in-
fact 57 as redress ability. 58
The court in 2004, in Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow,59 rejected the standing of a student's father to challenge the
words "under God" in the pledge of allegiance recited daily in the
public school.6" Newdow claimed standing to challenge this under the
First Amendment's Establishment and Religious Clauses on his own
behalf, as well as being the next friend of his daughter.6' Citing Allen
v. Wright,6 2 the Court stated that Newdow lacked prudential standing,
which prohibits a litigant from raising another person's right.63
This background of Supreme Court jurisprudence on standing set
the stage for the Court's 2006 decision in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno.64
III. DAIMLERCHRYSLER V. CUNO
According to Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in DaimlerChrysler v.
Cuno, Jeeps were first mass-produced in 1941 in Toledo, Ohio for the
U.S. Army.65 In 1998, defendants, City of Toledo and two local school
districts, offered DaimlerChrysler, the current Jeep manufacturer,
$280 million in tax benefits to keep it in Toledo, Ohio66 and to expand
its Jeep assembly plant. Ohio has a franchise tax67 that allows taxpay-
ers that purchase new manufacturing machinery and equipment and
57. Id. at 563. Affidavits of members showing an intent to return to foreign project sites at
which time they will presumably be denied the opportunity to observe endangered species is not
imminent injury. Similarly, other "novel" standing theories also fail. The alleged "ecosystem
nexus," whereby anyone who uses any part of an ecosystem has standing, even if the activity is
distant, is not sufficient to establish standing, nor is the "animal nexus," whereby anyone who
has an interest in seeing endangered animals, anywhere on the globe, has standing. Id. at 565.
58. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568. The agencies funding the projects were not parties to the case.
59. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
60. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 17. See generally, Katherine A. Meng, Note, In Light of Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow, Where Does the Court Stand on Standing?, 14 WIDENER L.J.
1021, 1021-22 (2005).
61. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 1.
62. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
63. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 2. California law did vest the father with the right to influence his
child's religious upbringing, but nothing impaired that right. California law did not give
Newdow the right to sue as next friend and other grounds asserted for standing, such as that the
father sometimes did attend and would attend classes with his child or would consider teaching
at the public school, did not respond to the prudential concerns.
64. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2286
(2006).
65. Id. at 1859.
66. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Ohio 2001), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 36 (2005).
67. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1859 (citing 1854 OHIo REV CODE ANN. § 5733.01
(2005)). Ohio is phasing out the franchise tax. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1859 n.1.
6
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install it in Ohio to receive a credit against that franchise tax.68 Mu-
nicipalities may offer partial property tax waivers to businesses that
invest in qualifying areas, 69 and this may become a complete property
tax waiver with consent from local school districts.7"
Eighteen plaintiffs sued to challenge the tax credits and exemptions
under the Commerce Clause. 71 The plaintiffs included taxpayers in
Toledo who claimed injury because the tax incentives diminished city
and state tax funds, creating a disproportionate burden on them. 72
Other plaintiffs included residents of Michigan who claimed injury be-
cause DaimlerChrysler would have expanded in Michigan if the Ohio
tax scheme were not offered.73 Other plaintiffs were residents of To-
ledo who claimed injury because they were displaced by the Jeep plant
expansion.74  Defendants included the municipal defendants, above,
then and current Toledo Mayor Carleton Finkbeiner, and the State of
Ohio and Ohio officials.75
The plaintiffs originally filed suit in state court; the defendants re-
moved the case to federal court.7 6 The plaintiffs moved to remand the
case to state court, but this was denied by the district court.77 The
district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.78 The dis-
trict court stated that despite the plaintiffs' clever arguments, the mu-
nicipal property tax exemption and state investment tax credit did not
68. OHIO REV. CODE ANN §5733.33 (2004), which states in pertinent part: "A nonrefund-
able credit is allowed against the tax imposed by Section 5733.06 of the Revised Code for a
taxpayer that purchases new manufacturing machinery and equipment during the qualifying pe-
riod, provided that the new manufacturing machinery and equipment are installed in this state
no later than December 31, 2016." The State of Ohio has discontinued offering new credits
against the franchise tax. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1859 n.1. See generally, Kirk J. Stark & Daniel J.
Wilson, What Do We Know About the Interstate Economic Effects of State Tax Incentives?, 4
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 133 (2006); Matt Kitchen, Comment, The Ohio Investment Tax Credit
Impermissible Burden or Necessary Benefit? Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
1685 (2005).
69. OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 5709.62(C)(1)(a) (2005). See generally, Edward A. Zelinsky,
Cuno: The Property Tax Issue, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2006).
70. OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN § 5709.62(D)(1).
71. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3. The plaintiffs also claimed a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Ohio Constitution. OHIO CONST. art. I, §2. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, 386
F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004).
72. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1859. Cuno and other plaintiffs were represented by
Associate Professor Peter Enrich, author of Saving States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints and State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996).
73. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1859 n.2.
74. Id.
75. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 2001), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 36 (2005).
76. Id. at 1198. The defendants alleged federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
77. Id. The plaintiffs stated that they had substantial doubts about their standing in federal
court. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1854 (2006). The district court held that
the taxpayer plaintiffs had municipal taxpayer standing. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (citing
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
78. Cuno, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.
7
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discriminate against interstate commerce and thus did not violate the
Commerce Clause.79
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling on the constitutionality of the Ohio property tax
exemption, but reversed the district court on the constitutionality of
Ohio's investment tax credits.80 The Court of Appeals did not address
the standing issue. While the Court of Appeals was sympathetic to
the efforts by Toledo to attract and keep business in its economically
depressed areas, the investment tax credit did not stand up under dor-
mant Commerce Clause scrutiny.81
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions of
whether the respondents had standing8" to challenge Ohio's tax credit,
and whether the investment tax credit violated the Commerce
Clause.83 The Supreme Court, in May 2006, held that the plaintiffs
did not establish the requisite standing to challenge the state franchise
tax credit, and the lower courts erred in even considering the claims
on the merits.84 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts began
addressing the standing issue by citing Marbury v. Madison85 on the
role of judicial review. The federal judiciary must respect the limited
role of the courts,86 in order to maintain the constitutional separation
of powers.87 The federal courts' proper role is limited to actual cases
or controversies,88 as enforced by Article III of the Constitution.89 A
core component is that the plaintiff must have standing.90
79. Id. at 1203. The two categories of taxation schemes which do violate the Commerce
Clause are a protective tariff or customs duty which taxes goods imported from another state but
not similar products produced in the state, and a discriminatory taxation based on proportion of
a business' activity carried on within a state as compared to business done in other states. Id.
80. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 750 (6th Cir. 2004). Associate Professor
Peter Enrich was on the brief and argued for the appellants. See Kristen E. Hickman & Sarah L.
Bunce, Foreword: DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEo. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 15 (2006).
81. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 746. See generally, Brent Nicholson & Sue Mota, The Dormant Com-
merce Clause Rises Again: Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, 5 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 320 (2005).
82. See generally Kristen E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway?: Considering the
Standing Question in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (2006); Kathryn
Lee Dietrich, Comment, Saving the States from Unsuitable Plaintiffs: Uncovering the Lack of
Standing in Challenges to State Income Tax Credits for Business Development, 36 CuMB. L. REv.
343 (2005 - 2006).
83, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 36 (2005) (mem.).
84. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2286 (2006).
85. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
86. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1860 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
87. Id. at 1861 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for the Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 477 (1982)).
88. Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
89. Id. (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)).
90. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
2006]
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The Court examined the standing of the plaintiffs as Ohio taxpayers
and concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge taxing or
spending decisions. 91 The Court stated that federal taxpayers' interest
in a challenge to federal appropriation, which would increase the bur-
den in the future on taxpayers, is remote and indeterminable,92 citing
Frothingham v. Mellon.93 This rationale also applies to state taxpayer
standing.94 While the plaintiffs argued that an exception should be
granted for Commerce Clause95 challenges, similar to the exception
for the Establishment Clause challenge allowed by the court in Flast v.
Cohen,96 the Court termed this "misguided." 97 If the exception was
extended, then almost any constitutional constraint on governmental
power would limit a state's taxing and spending power98 and could
open the floodgates in federal courts for taxpayer suits.
Similarly, examining the plaintiffs' standing as municipal taxpayers,
the Court stated that the plaintiffs tried to leverage municipal tax-
payer standing in two unacceptable ways. 99 First, the plaintiffs' chal-
lenge was still to the state law that allowed the franchise tax to be
distributed to municipalities,' ° not to a municipality's law. The effect
on the municipal taxpayer is merely conjecture.' 0' Second, the plain-
tiffs tried to leverage standing to all of their claims under supplemen-
tal jurisdiction from a claim that does not even, by itself, satisfy
standing.102 If this were allowed by the Court, it would result in "re-
markable implications. °103
Justice Ginsburg concurred but with a large reservation. 10 4 While
the Court's decision was consistent with precedent such as Frothing-
ham v. Mellon, °5 Doremus v. Board of Education of Hawthorne,a06
Flast v. Cohen,107 and Bowen v. Kendrick,1°8 Justice Ginsburg does not
91. Id at 1864.
92. Id. at 1862.
93. Frothingham v. Mellon, 288 F. 252. (1923).
94. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1863 (citing Doremus v. Bd. of Ed. of Hawthorne, 392
U.S. 429 (1952)).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
96. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
97. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1864.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1865-66.
100. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.12 (West 2005)). Additionally, the State of
Ohio suspended the distribution of franchise tax distribution to municipalities starting in 2001.
101. Id. at 1866.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1867.
104. Id. at 1869.
105. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
106. Doremus v. Bd. of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
107. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
108. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
9
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endorse later limits on standing in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization,19 Valley Forge Christian College v. American
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. 110 Allen v. Wright,"'
and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.' 12
Thus, the Court ordered that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit's holding was vacated in part, and remanded for dismissal on
the issue of the challenge to the state tax credit.
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IV. CONCLUSION
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno is a case of ironies. Ironically, Cuno and
other plaintiffs filed the case in state court, and when defendants re-
moved the case to federal court, the plaintiffs requested a remand to
state court, which was denied." 4 This then put the burden on the
plaintiffs to establish standing, and ultimately, they failed. Ironically,
the Ohio tax scheme was challenged both by Ohio taxpayers who al-
leged injury because of the tax incentives given to keep the Jeep plant,
as well as Michigan residents who alleged injury because they did not
get the Jeep plant expansion.1
1 5
While the State of Ohio may have preferred an outright ruling on
the merits to clarify the constitutionality of tax credits to promote eco-
nomic growth, the Court's ruling once again leveled the playing field
for states.1 16 After the ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit,117 only Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee were not
allowed to use the franchise tax credit, putting those states at a com-
parative disadvantage. Thus, Cuno' 18 again leaves all states with the
option to use such incentives.
This was not the result legal counsel for plaintiffs Peter Enrich de-
sired. Mr. Enrich, author of the article Saving States From Them-
109. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
110. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464 (1982).
111. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), Justice Ginsburg cited her opinion in Wright v.
Regan, 656 F. 2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which reversed the district court's decision dismissing this
case. The Court reversed the appeals court in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), holding that
the parents did not have standing to challenge the tax exemptions.
112. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
113. DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1868 (2006).
114. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d. 1196 (2001).
115. See DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. 1854. A further irony is that the displaced Ohio plain-
tiffs may have had a stronger case challenging the taking under eminent domain had it not been
for the Court's 2005 Decision in City of New London v. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). See gener-
ally, Brent Nicholson & Sue Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose - the Supreme Court
Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 GONz. L. REV. 8 (2005).
116. Brief for Petitioners at 14, Wilkins v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006) (No. 04-1724).
117. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (2004).
118. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
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selves: Commerce Clause Constraints on Tax Incentives for Business,
published in the Harvard Law Review, posits that states are caught in
a contest that none can win" 9 by offering such incentives, and this
results in a "race to the bottom."' ° Enrich concluded that the Court
should use the commerce clause to restrain this competition by the
states to induce businesses to stay, expand, or move to the state. 2'
Since that has not occurred, Enrich has suggested in the article that
Congress could statutorily restrict such efforts, but this is unlikely to
occur.122 Alternatively, plaintiffs other than taxpayers including busi-
nesses12 3 and states 124 themselves could raise the challenge. Finally,
citizen taxpayers may challenge such incentives in state courts, as most
states have relatively permissive standing standards. 125  This may be
the last viable hope to challenge such incentives.
119. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 405 (1996); see also Respondent's Brief
at 1, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006) (Nos. 04-1704, 04-1724).
120. Enrich, supra note 119, at 380.
121. Enrich, supra note 119, at 381.
122. Enrich, supra note 119, at 405, 406.
123. Enrich, supra note 119, at 412, 413. Enrich acknowledges that interstate businesses are
not the object of commerce clause concerns, and businesses actually benefit from such
incentives.
124. Enrich, supra note 119, at 422. States are suitable parties to raise the challenge. Ac-
cording to Enrich, "States hold their salvation in their own hands."
125. Enrich, supra note 119, at 415, 416. States, however, may be less hospitable on the
merits.
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